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AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR PETER SINGER 
 
 
Denise Russell: Professor Singer, I would like to begin with a question 
concerning ethical issues in relation to animals. What difference do you 
see from twenty years ago?  
 
Peter Singer: I think the big difference is that there is no question now 
that animals are a significant ethical issue. They are part of the agenda of 
any debate about the nature of ethics and the reach of ethical concerns, or 
in other words: how far do our ethical concerns extend? When I first 
became interested in these issues, towards the end of 1970, they were 
really completely new issues. It was very hard to find any on-going 
discussion about ethics and animals. There was really no one writing 
about it, although there were many works of philosophy being written 
where you can see, looking at it now, that they just basically overlooked 
the problem. I mean, for example, accounts of the nature of equality 
which explain equality by saying all humans are equal because all 
humans have interests, in that they can all suffer or enjoy life and this is 
a basic human right, etc. etc. Then the rest of the argument goes on, 
entirely about humans and this is supposed to be a basis for human 
equality. Obviously the criterion for equality just given includes non-
human animals as well as humans and that would seem to imply by the 
nature of the argument that animals are in some way equal as well. Yet 
the author does not even pause to say why animals are not included 
because the question does not even occur to him.  There were quite a few 
articles being written around that time like that. There were also one or 
two rather peripheral articles that did raise the question of animals but 
usually in order to dismiss it with some fairly rhetorical expression like: 
'Of course they lack the intrinsic dignity that humans have' or 'Animals 
are not ends in themselves. They don't have intrinsic worth.'  So there 
was no serious discussion at the beginning of the 1970's about this issue. 
And that has completely changed. Clearly it is an issue that is on the 
philosophical agenda and it is on political and social agendas as well. 
You only have to open up any text book of applied ethics or 
contemporary moral issues and you are pretty sure to find some 
discussion about the moral status of animals or our ethical obligations to 
animals.   
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Denise Russell:  Another question I wanted to ask has to do with animal 
rights. I think in this area that talk about rights has some rhetorical force 
but a rights position is difficult to defend. In your early work you did talk 
a little about rights and then you had that paper in the mid-eighties where 
you tried to distance yourself from Regan's position on animal rights. I 
wonder what your position is now. Do you think that it is useful to talk 
in terms of animal rights or  would you prefer to stay with a more strictly 
utilitarian perspective? 
 
Peter Singer: I think my view has always been that the grounding for 
ethical consideration in relation to animals is in terms of their capacity to 
feel, and in terms of the wrongness of inflicting pain on beings 
irrespective of their species.  I don't think my view has ever been one 
that was really grounded in terms of rights. It is true, as you say, that in 
the first edition of Animal Liberation  I talked about animals having a 
right to equal consideration of their interests, and the  differentiation that 
I drew later on was merely because I felt that this had been 
misinterpreted into the view that I was defending an animal rights 
position, by which I mean that the grounding of the whole position is 
based on some claim about rights.  I never thought that that was really 
very helpful. So I think the position I hold now is still essentially that, 
i.e. that the grounding is not in terms of rights but on the other hand that 
rights may be useful as a kind of short-hand, particularly in the political 
arena, where so much of these discussions is couched in terms of rights 
that you have to quite deliberately avoid the language of rights.  That 
somehow marks you out from other issues where people will debate 
about whether the foetus has a right to life, species have a right to exist 
and so on. So I am certainly prepared to use the term 'rights' in that 
political context, not so much as a philosopher, but more as a 
campaigner.  More recently in The Great Ape Project  we actually start 
the book with a declaration on behalf of the great apes which claims that 
they have three basic rights, namely the rights to life, liberty and 
protection from torture; but that is quite clearly being used as a statement 
in the political domain, not as a philosophical grounding. The point of 
this is simply that we are always talking about rights for humans - we 
have got the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and so on.  
We are trying quite deliberately to put the rights of the non-human great 
apes there alongside those of humans.  
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Denise Russell:  When you use rights talk for political purposes, what do 
you do when you are confronted with people who mention the issue of 
conflicting rights? Say if you are talking about moral vegetarianism and 
somebody says, what about the human right to eat animals? 
 
Peter Singer: Well at that point I think you have to stop just using 
'rights' as a political slogan and you have to ask what is the basis for 
what we are talking about, and then you have to say, well really what we 
want is equal consideration of interests. We have to consider the interests 
of humans in eating and the interests of animals in not being made to 
suffer and so on. And of course if the humans can't survive without 
eating animals then there is a real clash, a real conflict of interests. If on 
the other hand what we are talking about is whether humans will 
continue to eat pork rather than tofu, when they can be nourished just as 
well or better by the tofu, then it is a less serious clash. So I do think you 
have to get away from the rights language at this point otherwise you just 
get a swapping of intuitions: 'Well I think I have a right to eat'; 'No, I 
think animals have a right to life' and that doesn't get any further.  
 
Denise Russell: Yes. On the Great Ape Project, would you like to bring 
us up to date with what is happening with that? 
 
Peter Singer: Yes. The Great Ape Project now has co-ordinators in a 
number of different countries, in the United States, in England, in 
Germany, in Sweden, in Finland, in Taiwan, in New Zealand and other 
places as well, and we are working on different levels simultaneously.  
On the one hand we are just trying to raise the general awareness of the 
issue of why we demarcate ourselves from apes. The whole point of the 
project is to use the animals who are most like us, and who are best 
studied and about whom we know most in terms of their self-awareness 
and their capacities, as a kind of bridge to narrow the gulf between 
humans and animals and to say, look, we can't classify the animal 
kingdom into humans and animals. There are beings who are very like 
us, and there are beings who are less like us, and you have got to look at 
them differently.  The Great Ape Project is a way of asking what is it that 
is so special about being human?  There is clearly a great overlap 
between the capacities of the other great apes and our own.  On one level 
we are trying to raise consciousness about that issue and on another level 
we are working to try to change the law wherever that is possible. So we 
are having on-going discussions with lawyers concerned about animal 
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rights issues in a number of different countries about possibilities for 
bringing lawsuits, the purpose of which would be to have animals, or 
particularly say a chimpanzee, declared to be a being with a legal 
standing of its own rather than a thing; in other words, we want apes to 
be, not property but beings who have rights in themselves.  So that is 
another level, the legal level. And then we have also been working quite 
specifically where we have seen opportunities for particular apes. In the 
talk tonight I'll be showing a video about one particular ape that was in a  
laboratory and who we managed to get out.  
 
Denise Russell: Could you say a little bit more about the lawsuits? Are 
these designed just with the aim of trying to get apes recognized as 
beings in their own right and not property? 
 
Peter Singer:  Yes, that is the basic idea of it, to take that kind of step, 
that kind of breakthrough. Obviously ideally we would like them to be 
declared legal persons with the same basic rights that humans have.   
 
Denise Russell:  Are you familiar with the case which  was argued in 
connection with the dolphins who Herman and his research team were 
studying? 
 
Peter Singer:  Yes, the Hawaii case.  
 
Denise Russell: The people who took the dolphins and released them 
were trying to put the argument that the dolphins shouldn't be regarded 
as property but as persons.  
 
Peter Singer:  Yes, in a sense that is the kind of case we are running.  
We think that that case was perhaps run prematurely. There wasn't either 
the climate or the preparations for it and I don't think that dolphins are 
the ideal species either because there isn't really enough established 
about dolphins in the same way that there is about chimpanzees for 
example. But yes, we would like to run a case like that which had a 
better chance of success.  
 
Denise Russell: Does it have to be property or persons. Is there any other 
way of arguing this within Western laws?  
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Peter Singer:  There is a possibility for some sort of intermediate status, 
if that is what you mean and there have been some American and some 
European decisions suggesting that animals may have a kind of 
intermediate status. Here is an example at a very crude level: normally, if 
a garage takes your car and negligently does something which means that 
your car is written off, what you get back is the market value of the car. 
In the past there were cases in which a vet or someone else did that to a 
cat, and all that the owner got back was the market value of the cat. Now 
recently there have been cases in which it was held that the owner would 
be held entitled to loss and suffering in some way analogous to that 
which one might have for a member of the family. So it is not the market 
value of the property, or the cost of replacing it anymore.  This is a tiny 
incremental breakthrough in the idea that animals are not just property, 
but obviously we don't feel that that goes nearly far enough.  
 
Denise Russell:  I thought on reading the case about the dolphins that 
having to argue that they were persons might have been a very difficult 
argument to run, given the prevalent attitudes. If the lawyers had tried to 
argue that they shouldn't be regarded as property even though they are 
not persons then perhaps they might have had more success. I was just 
wondering about the legal technicalities here. 
 
Peter Singer:  I think the law has been a bit dichotomous. It has divided 
things into property and persons and there are just now these suggestions 
of a kind of half-way status but I suppose people were not very clear 
about it - in the dolphin case people were probably not clear that there 
was that possibility. 
 
Denise Russell:  One other question that I wanted to ask you was about 
the dispute that sometimes crops up between people who are looking at 
the interests of animals and people who see themselves as looking at  the 
interests of the environment more broadly. I was wondering whether you 
had any thoughts on that sort of debate and the point that some people in 
the environment movement suggest that those who have a strong interest 
in the welfare of animals are really operating from a liberal humanist 
perspective and are limited because of that.   
 
Peter Singer:  Yes, there is clearly a sense in which the views that I 
hold, although they are quite radical in their implications for how we 
should change our  relationships with animals, are also relatively 
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conventional in the way they derive from an easily recognisable western 
philosophical tradition - you could call it  liberal-humanist or you could 
call it utilitarian. There is nothing radically different or new about it. I 
see that as its strength, in that it means that it is something that you can 
really  use to argue with I see that as its strength, in that it means that it is 
something that you can really  use to argue with people who are also in 
that tradition - and most people in our society are - and within their own 
terms you can convince them that the views that they hold are 
inconsistent, or more broadly incoherent, or make arbitrary distinctions 
that can't be defended. If on the other hand you switch to a kind of 
ecological holistic perspective you really detach yourself from all those 
traditions and it is much harder for you to bring your view into a sharp 
confrontation with the views that most people hold. It's almost, and this 
is a bit of a parody, like saying what people used to say in the '60's, 
unless you drop acid and turn on you won't be able to see what I am 
talking about.  Most people are not going to do that so the question is 
how that kind of argument is really going to be made to work. I guess 
that is the problem for me too. I'd like to really understand how we can 
defend the interests of the ecology as a whole and for its own sake.  I 
have no difficulty with arguments for preserving an ecosystem that are 
based on the interests of sentient beings.  For example, we can claim that 
the preservation of a wetlands is vitally important because without it 
thousands of birds, frogs and other sentient beings will die.  But what if 
there were no sentient beings who would be any worse off if a particular 
local ecosystem perished? Can we still find good arguments to say that it 
would be wrong to cause the ecosystem to perish? What would those 
arguments be like? This is a genuine question: I am not saying that there 
are no such arguments, I am asking for an account of what they might be 
based on. 
 
Denise Russell:  Where does that leave you in thinking about the 
environment as a whole?  
 
Peter Singer:  I don't think that in any way it makes it difficult for me to 
argue that it is very important to defend the integrity of ecological 
systems. But the way I would do so is not by saying that ecosystems have 
intrinsic rights. Still less would it be by personifying ecosystems and 
treating them as agents or conscious beings or something of that sort. It 
would rather be by saying, look if you cut down the forests you destroy 
the habitat of many thousands of sentient beings and they will suffer and 
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die. You foreclose the possibilities of aesthetic and recreational 
appreciation by humans. You risk polluting the rivers and causing 
erosion and climatic change and so on. I would use all of those 
arguments.  I wouldn't say that the forest as such has a right to remain.  
 
Denise Russell:  So it would be the instrumental value in this instance?  
 
Peter Singer: Yes, for me sentient beings have intrinsic value. Anything 
that is not a sentient being can only have instrumental value; but it may 
have very great instrumental value of course.  
 
Denise Russell:  How far do you currently think the range of sentient 
beings extends with your understanding of the empirical work and so on? 
 
Peter Singer: Well I have a grey area on that and I guess that it's 
inevitable that one will. I think that vertebrates are clearly sentient.  I 
think that crustacea are very probably sentient. I think that some 
molluscs such as the octopus is no doubt sentient but I'm doubtful 
whether simpler molluscs such as oysters are sentient. I'm not saying 
definitely that they are not, but I'm doubtful. I noticed that David de 
Grazia goes into this in his recent book Taking Animals Seriously, and he 
offers some argument that insects may not be sentient. I think that is still 
a grey area too but you would have to say it would be a source of relief if 
one could reasonably believe that insects are not sentient, particularly for 
anyone living in Australia! 
 
Denise Russell: Especially cockroaches. 
 
Peter Singer: I was thinking of especially mosquitos and ants. I can live 
without going around killing cows or pigs or birds, but to go around 
without killing ants is not easy. 
 
Denise Russell: No, unless you are a Jainist (who sweep ants from their 
path) - but even the sweeping may kill. Just finally, and maybe you don't 
want to answer this, what do you see in the contemporary times as the 
key ethical problem in relation to animals? Do you think it is the fact that 
we continue to experiment on them, or that we continue to eat them or 
put them in zoos?  
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Peter Singer: I think that the food issue is fundamental for two reasons. 
One is that simply in terms of the numbers of animals used, the amount 
of sheer misery that we inflict on animals is vastly greater in farming 
than it is in experimentation. You just have to look at the numbers. In 
experimentation worldwide you might be talking about 100 or 200 
million animals at the most, but there are five billion chickens produced 
in the United States alone every year. So the numbers are just 
enormously greater and the suffering - though you might not be able to 
see it in quite such vivid terms as when you read a description of a 
scientific experiment - can be very extreme and also very prolonged.  
 
The other reason why the food issue is fundamental is that it helps to 
form our attitudes to animals. We don't grow up experimenting on 
animals. We do grow up eating animals and I think that has a marked 
effect on the attitudes that we take to animals afterwards.  It makes us 
think of animals as objects for our use, rather than beings with lives of 
their own, and that is where all the problems start. 
 
